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THE STATE OF NEW YORK 
SUPREME COURT: COUNTY OF ALBANY 
.In, .th.e,JVI~tt~r of ¢e Application of 
I ; . • ~ ./ .. 
FERNANDO SERRANO, ·&8-A-33.14, 
' .· . . · . . 
Petitioner, 
-against-
BRJON, D~ TRAVIS, CHAIRMAN 
DIVISiON OF PAROLE, 
Respondent. 
For a Jddgment pursuant to Article 78 
of the Civil Practice Law and Rules. 
(Supreme Court, Albany Cottnty, Special Term, April 25, 2003) 
(Justic~ ,Edward A Sheridi:tn, ·presiding) 
. . . 
SHERIDAN, J.: 
FERNANDO SERRANO, Em.E 
Fishkill Correctional Facility 
P.O. Box 1245 
Beacon, New York 12508 
HON. ELIOT SPITZER 
Attorney General of the State of New York 
(Gerald J. Rock, of Counsel) 
Attorney for Respondent 
" The Capitol 
Albany, New York 12224 
Index #541-03 
RJI #01-03-STI404 
Decision, Order and 
Judgment 
Petitioner, currently an inmate at Fishkill Correctional facility, brings this special 
proceeding pursuant to Article 78 of the CPLR, seeking review of respondent's denial of his 
application for parole. 
Petitioner is serving a sentence of 15 years to life imposed upon his conviction, by 
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guilty plea, of murder in the second degree. The sentence arose from an incident in July, 1987, 
during which petitioner, in a fit of jealous rage, stabbed and killed his wife. One week before the 
tragedy his wife had moved out of their apartment. At her request, petitioner went to see his wife 
at her new residence, in part, to give her a set of keys to the marital residence for the use of their 
children. After he gave her the keys, she said to him that now her lover would have a set of keys. 
She repeated this statement later on, at which time petitioner lost control. He grabbed a kitchen knife 
from the counter and stabbed her once in the chest, killing her. 
Petitioner made his initial appearance before the Board of Parole at Fishkill 
Correctional Facility on May 22, 2002. At the hearing, the Commissioners specifically asked 
petitioner why he had committed the crime. Petitioner's institutional programming was discussed, 
as was his excellent disciplinary record and his significant academic achievements. The Board 
denied petitioner's application for parole, stating: 
Parole is denied. You currently are serving IS~years-to-life for 
murder, two, where you stabbed and killed your estranged wife. You 
allowed your anger and resentment towards your wife to rise to the 
point of extreme anger and out-of-control jealous rage. In your 
interview, you minimized the effect of your behavior. Discretionary 
release at this time would deprecate the seriousness of the instant 
offense and diminish respect for the law. Unspecified guidelines, 
involved weapon usage, use of excessive violence against a person, 
caused the death of the victim, escalation of criminal behavior. 
Petitioner was ordered held for 24 months. Petitioner's administrative appeal was not answered by 
respondent within the time required, and he commenced this judicial proceeding. 
Petitioner contends that the Board denied him parole release solely based on the 
nature of his crime, and that the Board failed to discharge its statutory and regulatory obligations to 
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conduct a fair review ofpetitioner•s application. Respondent answers that the denial of parole was 
based on a hearing and review of petitioner's file that were conducted in accordance with all 
statutory, constitutional and regulatory requirements, and that the determination must therefore be 
affirmed. 
Executive Law §259-i(2)(c) provides in pertinent part as follows: 
Discretionary release on parole shall not be granted merely as a 
reward for good conduct or efficient performance of duties while 
confined but after considering if there is a reasonable probability that, 
if such inmate is released, he ·will live and remain at liberty without 
violating the Jaw. and that his release is not incompatible with the 
welfru:e of society and will not so deprecate the seriousness of his 
crime as to undermine respect for law. 
Section 259-i(2)( c) goes on to provide that the parole release guidelines shall require 
consideration, among other things, of the inmate's institutional record, performance in any temporary 
release program, release plans, any deportation order, and any statement made to the Board by the 
crime victim. The Board is also required to consider the inmate's instant offense and prior criminal 
history (see Executive Law§ §259-i[l J [a), [2] [a]). Section 259-i(S) provides that "any action by the 
Board ... pursuant to this article shall be deemed a judicial function and shall not be reviewable if 
done in accordance with law." 
Within these general statutory guideposts, the Parole Board has wide discretion in 
deciding whether or not to grant parole release. "So long as the Board violates no positive statutory 
requirement, its discretion is absolute and beyond review in the Courts" (Matter of Briguglio v 
Board of Parole, 24 NY2d 21, 29, quoting Matter of Hines v State Board of Parole, 293 NY 254, 
257). The discretionary determination of the Parole Board, if made in accordance with the statutes, 
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will not be disturbed absent a showing of error or irrationality bordering on impropriety (see Matier 
of Silmon v Travis, 95 NY2d 470; Matter of Saunders v Travis, 238 AD2d 688, Iv denied90 NY2d 
805, citing Matter of Russo v N YS. Bd of Parole, 50 NY2d 69, 77; Matter of Ristau v Hammock, 
I 03 AD2d 944, Iv denied 63 NY2d 608). 
Pursuant to the statutes and regulations that govern the Parole Board• s determinations, 
a candidate's criminality is a valid factor for the Board to consider (Executive Law §§259-i(I )(a), 
(2)(c); 9 NYCRR §8001.3). Thus, the Board must consider the circumstances, nature, and 
seriousness of an inmate's instant offense (see Matter of Geames v Travis, 284 AD2d' 843, appeal 
dismissed 97 NY2d 63 9; Matter of Fusco v Chairman, Bd of Parole of State of New York, 59 AD2d 
973, /v denied 43 NY2d 648; Matter of Consilvio v N Y.S. Bd of Parole, 57 AD2d 955, 956). And 
ordinarily the weight to be accorded the various factors considered by the Parole Board is a matter 
within the Board's discretion (Matter of Johnson v Travis, 284 AD2d 686; Matter of Geames v 
Travis, supra; Matter of Garcia v N Y.S. Div. of Parole, 239 AD2d 235; People ex rel. Herbert v 
NYS. Bd. of Parole, 97 AD2d 128). 
The determination on its face sets forth sufficient grounds to deny parole. However, 
a review of the transcript of the parole release interview reveals several serious defects requiring a 
new bearing. First, the decision states that petitioner minimized the effect of his behavior. However, 
the Commissioners specifically asked petitioner why he committed the crime and what drove him 
to the point at which he would commit such a crime. Petitioner stated that it was jealousy and 
stupidity. He specifically prefaced his explanation of what happened with the statement "I don't 
want to blame the victim in any kind of way, because I could have walked away. I should have 
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walked away.', Repeatedly expressing remorse, the fact that he then candidly recounted what 
happened and how it affected him, in direct response to the Commissioner's questions, can not 
support a finding that he minimized the effect of his actions. There is nothing else in the transcript 
of the hearing which would support such a finding. 
Second, the decision also recites that the instant crime constituted an "escalation of 
criminal behavior." However, this was petitioner's first offense and could not possibly constitute an 
"escalation." It is impossible for the Court to determine whether the Board erred with respect to 
petitioner's criminal history or what was meant by such statement. 
Finally, the statements of one of the Commissioners show that she was displeased 
with the sentence that petitioner received. She stated "[S]ome who have committed the same crime 
that you have have been given 20-to-life and 25-to-Jife," and immediately thereafter "[S]o, whose 
life is worth 20 years, and whose life is worth 25?" Parole was then denied on the ground, inter alia, 
that release would deprecate the seriousness of the crime and diminish respect for the law. The 
Commissioner's statements are directly contrary to the determination of the sentencing judge, who 
clearly had a more extensive opportunity to review all of the circumstances of the criine and who 
specifically stated that 15 years of prison constituted a sufficient punishment in this case. 
"The role of the Parole Board is not to resentence petitioner according to the personal 
opinions ofits members as to the appropriate penalty for murder, but to determine whether, as of this 
moment, given all the relevant statutory factors, he should be released." (Matter of King v New York 
State Div. of Parole, 190 AD2d 423, 432, affd 83 NY2d 788, supra). The Court continued stating 
"[T]he Legislature, however, has not defined 'seriousness of [the] crime' in terms of specific 
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categories of either crimes or victims and it is apparent that in order to preclude the granting of 
parole exclusively on this ground there must have been some significantly aggravating or egregious 
circumstances surrounding the commission of the particular crime (see, People ex rel. Thomas v 
Superintendent, 124 AD2d 848, 849 [parole properly denied due to "'extraordinarily serious and 
bizarre nature of the present offenses"']). Ce11ainly every murder conviction is inherently a matter 
of the utmost seriousness since it reflects the unjustifiable taking and tragic loss of a human life. 
Since; however, the Legislature has determined that a murder conviction per se should not preclude 
parole, there must be a showing of some aggravating circtunstances beyond the inherent seriousness 
of the crime itself." (id. at 433). 
More recently, this Court has held that the Parole Board is not a resentencing 
authority; that sentencing is a function of the Court pursuant to legislatively enacted sentence ranges 
as approved and enacted into law by the Executive; and that the role of the Parole Board is to decide 
when an irunate may safely and appropriately be returned to society " . . . considering if there is a 
reasonable probability that , if such inmate is released, he will live and remain at liberty without 
violating the law, and that his release is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will not so 
deprecate the seriousness of his criine as to undermine respect for law." Executive Law § 259-
1(2)(c); see, Matter of Chan v Travis, NYLJ. 3/27/03, p28, col 4). In an indeterminate sentencing 
structure, this requires a due regard for the_ views of the sentencingjudge, clearly ignored here, whose 
minimum sentence presumptively has established a threshold release date assuming appropriate 
institutional adjustment and rehabilitative effort. 1 Denial of release at the threshold or later must 
'. It might be otherwise if the Parole Board was following a policy to "level" 
indeterminate sentences and to avoid sentencing disparities for similar crimes. However, there is 
no indication in this record or in any other case that has come before this Court that the Board is 
pursuing such a policy. 
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be individualized, reasoned and particularized within statutory guidelines. Merely parroting the 
statutory language is not statutory compliance. Moreover, unreasoned and pro forma denial 
undermines the rehabilitative ideal which is the keystone of indeterminate sentencing under which 
thousands of inmates remain incarcerated in this State. 
A review of the statutory factors applicable to petitioner shows that he had an 
exceptional disciplinary record with only one tier JI proceeding in 15 years of incarceration. He 
obtaine-d his GED and an associates degree (para-legal) and has both participated and worked in 
alternatives to violence programs and alcoholics anonymous, as well as participating in numerous 
other betterment programs. He has a suitable housing arrangement if released and apparently has 
the ability to find gainful employment. All of such factors support release on parole. 
Without more, the Board's "seriousness of offense" rationalization cannot stand. Its 
"minimized the effects" holding is ambiguously flawed and the innuendo of"re-sentencing," if that 
is what occurred here, is clearly ultra vires. 
Accordingly, the petition is GRANTED, the determination denying parole is annulled, 
and the matter is remanded to the Board of Parole for a prompt re-hearing before a new panel and 
a decision not inconsistent with this Court's decision. 
This memorandum shall constitute the Decision, Order and Judgment of this Court. 
All papers, including this Decision, are being returned to respondent's attorney. The 
signing of this Decision shall not constitute entry or filing. Counsel is not relieved from the 
applicable provisions of the CPLR respecting filing, entry and notice of entry. 
SO ORDERED. 
ENTER JUDGMENT. 
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Dated: Albany, New York 
September :z. Z- , 2003 
INDEX #541-03 
4f~T/<--{c/~ . 
1/EdWardA. Sheridan, A.J.S.C. 
PAPERS CONSIDERED: 
(J) Orqer to Show Cause, signed February 13, 2003; 
(2) Petition, sworn to January 20, 2003, with exhibits A-H; 
(3) Verified Answer, dated April 14, 2003; 
(4) Affirmation of Gerald J. Rock, Esq., dated April 14, 2003, with exhibits A-I; 
(5) Reply Affidavit of Fernando Serrano sworn to April 23, 2003. 
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